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Resumo
Um tema recorrente na história econômica e social do Brasil diz respeito a dificuldade de fazer cumprir as leis aprovadas. Isso 
cria uma sensação de impunidade e fraqueza moral, tanto para os estrangeiros quanto para os próprios brasileiros. Esse artigo 
busca construir um quadro de referência teórica, no qual as leis no Brasil são propositadamente muito ambiciosas, buscando um 
progresso social e econômico. Ao fazer isso, no entanto, existe um entendimento que a estrutura social e política é incapaz de fazer 
cumprir na sua plenitude a nova lei. Só com o tempo. Desse modo, existe um “trade off” entre um projeto social ambicioso (que 
traz um “beneficio social”), e o descompasso com a efetiva possibilidade de se conseguir cumprir a lei (o que acarreta um custo 
“moral”). O quadro teórico mostra o equilíbrio entre benefício e custo social, que dita “o grau de enforcement” atingido, e mu-
danças que possam alterar esse quadro. O modelo é aplicado para examinar a governança corporativa no Brasil durante as`três 
últimas décadas do século XIX, e examina a crise do “Encilhamento” nesse período
Abstract
The difficulty of making laws stick is a recurring theme in Brazilian economic and social history. Both foreigners and Brazilians 
feel this difficulty creates a sense of impunity and moral weakness. This articles seeks to establish a theoretical reference model 
wherein Brazilian laws are purposely ambitious in the direction of social and political progress. There is an understanding that the 
social and political structure is incapable of enforcing these new laws in their entirety. Only with time. Thus there exists a trade-off 
between an ambitious social project (which provides a social good) and the delay in the effective enforcement of these laws (which 
bears a moral cost). This theory reveals the balance between social goods and costs that determines the degree of enforcement 
attained as well as the changes that alter this model. This model is used to examine corporate governance in Brazil during the last 
three decades of the nineteenth century and examines the crisis of the ”Encilhamento” of this period..
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Introduction
he main purpose of this article is to 
develop a theoretical framework to 
examine historical examples in which 
progressive laws are enacted, but the enforce-
ment of such laws takes time to consolidate. 
In it, five topics are discussed: the making of new 
laws; the trade-offs between the new “modern” 
laws and enforcement; the marginal costs of en-
forcement; the optimal level of enforcement; and 
the role of financial innovation and of society 
preferences for improvements in moral capital. 
In order to apply this framework to histo-
rical events in Brazil, we intend, as an example, 
to examine the issue of corporate governance 
in listed Brazilian companies during the period 
1882-1890. Our intention is only to sketch some 
aspects of the financial history of this period, 
as a way to provoke the development of deeper 
studies. 
At the end of the Empire (1822-1889), 
and at the beginning of the Republic (1889-pre-
sent), three important pieces of legislation were 
enacted: the 1882 Corporation Law, the 1882 
Decree regulating the Law, and the 1890 Decree 
modifying the Corporation Law. 
In the two decades 1870 and 1880, there 
was a period of outstanding development of ca-
pital markets and company investments in Bra-
zil, ending in the financial crisis called “Encilha-
mento”. There was a sentiment at the time that 
“bad” enforcement of these laws was partially 
responsible for the crisis. On the other hand, the 
new laws were praised as progressive and impor-
tant for the industrial and financial development 
of the country. In order to evaluate the trade-offs 
involved, we apply the theoretical framework 
developed in the first part of the article. 
Corporate Governance
Corporate governance, in modern times, 
has become not only an important new field of 
inquiry in corporate finance, but is also conside-
red a factor for economic growth at the national 
level. In the past, however, the concept of cor-
porate governance was not widespread, although 
the practice of some of its tenets was followed in 
corporate life. 
Using a modern concept, we can de-
fine the system of corporate governance as es-
tablishing the rules and regulations that guide 
the behavior of controlling shareholders, board 
members, and the professional managers of cor-
porations. Good governance can have a positive 
impact on profitability and overall economic per-
formance, and attract investments in the capital 
markets for the company. Given the importance 
of corporations for the economy at large, good 
governance ends up creating more jobs and inco-
me for the country.
Corporate governance is based on a com-
bination of the corporation laws themselves and 
enforcement of the respective rules and regula-
tions. In general, the legal framework sets two 
main objectives: (i) to provide a system of eco-
nomic incentives for managers, in order to align 
their actions with the objective of wealth creation 
for the shareholders; (ii) to define and establish 
rules and responsibilities and other accountabili-
ty measures in order to provide a fair distribution 
of company profits among the main stakeholders 
(corporate managers, shareholders and creditors) 
and avoid that majority shareholders and other 
insiders use their power to extract value from 
minority shareholders, non voting shareholders, 
creditors, and others outsiders.
Corporate governance is a continuous set 
of actions and attitudes with the leadership of the 
T
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CEOs and oversight by the Board of Directors. 
The Corporation Laws set the legal framework 
and define the rights and duties of the stakehol-
ders, but corporate government in a sense is the 
on-going enforcement of the norms and regu-
lations under this law. Therefore, when a new 
corporate law is enacted, like the 1882 and 1890 
pieces of legislation, it was implicit that with 
proper enforcement they would receive practical 
content and become an engine for the creation 
of profitable companies and for the attraction of 
large numbers of shareholders.  
The Making of New Laws 
in Brazil
When one examines the economic his-
tory of Brazil in the last two centuries, one as-
pect that calls attention is the alleged low level 
of enforcement of regulations and laws, and an 
associated high level of corruption. 
In countries like Brazil, we say that some 
laws “stick”, while others exist, but are ignored. 
In others words, the enforcement of laws is une-
ven. The coexistence of laws that are enforced, 
or partially enforced, or not enforced at all is a 
typical aspect of the history of Brazil, and I sus-
pect of other less developed countries as well.
Sometimes, it is claimed the country has 
a “low moral capital”, or that the “culture” of the 
inhabitants is intrinsically tolerant - more than is 
desirable - for law breaking and corruption. I am 
using the expression “moral capital” to indicate 
the set of cultural and behavioral social attitudes 
translated into an honest conduct in the ordinary 
business of life. It is a new concept, and has the 
same nature as “human capital” or “social capi-
tal”: it can be measured and treated as a stock, 
it can suffer depletion and depreciation, and can 
be built-up or replenished with new investment.
As economists and economic historians, 
we should be suspicious of such generalizations 
about the presumed intrinsic dishonest behavior 
of the population of Brazil. After all, the Bra-
zilian population is a melting pot of different 
ethnic groups and varied cultural backgrounds. 
Perhaps, if we examine the macro and microe-
conomics of the decision process related to law 
creation and law enforcement, we can offer ano-
ther explanation. 
In this section we attempt a broad eco-
nomic explanation of why laws are “good” and 
enforcement is “bad” in countries like Brazil, 
in order to use this theoretical framework for 
an analysis of the Brazilian corporation laws of 
1882 and 1890. We want to propose the hypo-
thesis that there is a conscious trade-off, in whi-
ch the country adopts a “modern” law knowing 
beforehand that this new law cannot be totally 
enforced immediately, but only gradually.  
We are using here a very broad definition 
of enforcement. Enforcement in a narrow sense 
is defined as to compel, sometimes obtaining 
obedience by threat. Enforcement is also defined 
as to execute the law with vigor. In this paper, we 
mean by “enforcement”  the set of actions and 
devices allowing the rules and regulations to re-
ach their goals. In this sense, it includes: (i) the 
building-up of the necessary pre-requisites for 
a proper enforcement; (ii) the actions needed to 
overcome the petty institutional bottlenecks whi-
ch create obstacles; (iii) to change the existing 
micro-culture sometimes foreign to the new law, 
as it was the case when introducing a corporation 
law in the coffee plantation society of Brazil; (iv) 
to undertake the small investments needed to put 
the enforcement in order; (v) to create the an-
cillary means in order to get a credible response 
to the objectives of the “modern” law. 
We want first to examine the issue of 
why developing countries choose more advan-
miolo_revista10.indd   135 9/11/2012   09:18:20
136 História e Economia Revista Interdisciplinar 
ced laws as “role models”. Economic historians 
have done an outstanding work of studying the 
importance of technological progress for the 
economic development of regions and countries. 
In this context, transfer among nations of new 
technologies can foster economic growth in ba-
ckward countries, as argued by Gerschenkron. 
In my view, the same reasoning applies 
for the transfer of laws, rules and regulations 
from industrialized countries to less developed 
countries. As in the case of technology, the de-
veloping countries can profit from the experien-
ce of more developed countries, adopting their 
institutions and “skipping” stages for the crea-
tion of their own institutions. The major diffe-
rence is that technology transfer occurs mostly at 
the company level of business decisions, while 
transfer of laws, rules, and regulations are made 
at the institutional and political level, involving 
society as a whole.
During the process of law making and 
adoption, there is a “borrowing” of laws, rules 
and regulations from more advanced countries, 
which set standards far above the ones which 
would be set only by domestic considerations 
given the prevailing culture of the country. Ho-
wever, what is not generally perceived, or when 
it is, is treated as a trade-off, is that the laws, ru-
les, and regulations can be borrowed, but not the 
other institutional features that mold and cement 
the framework of enforcement.
The pressure to adopt “modern” laws can 
be induced either by domestic forces, as a sign 
of social progress, or by foreign initiatives from 
countries exerting cultural, political, or econo-
mic influence on the country that adopts the laws. 
In the choice of the “role model”, the 
developing country sets high aspirations for so-
cial or economic change to be obtained by the 
adoption of the new law. The new law is seen 
as placing an ambitious target, a bench mark 
for progress. It is an agenda for social reform or 
the modernization of the economy, establishing 
ambitious goals to be achieved. However, any 
“good” law needs “good” enforcement. It is not 
only a question of approving the new law. It has 
to be enforced. In other words, it is an ongoing 
process.
In addition to not meeting all the pre-re-
quisites for a proper total enforcement, the “mo-
dern” law can create incentives for the individu-
als and companies affected to delay the enfor-
cement. Some of the new laws can bring social 
improvements and foster the offer of merit goo-
ds, but can adversely affect production or con-
sumption in the short run. For instance, new laws 
about child labor, environmental protection, food 
quality, etc. Other pieces of legislation may set 
equity goals that hurt efficiency goals. In some 
cases, non-economic (equity) considerations 
prevail over economic (efficiency) conditions in 
the “modern laws”, reflecting the social progress 
pursued by the developed countries responsible 
for making the laws. We could list other situa-
tions, but the point to be made is that the new 
laws can create externalities, and give incentives 
to disobey the laws by taking decisions and ac-
tions based on private costs (benefits) rather than 
social costs (benefits). 
We could summarize by saying that in 
some situations the companies perceive that by 
not obeying the laws the private costs are smaller 
than the social costs, and thus they can reach high 
production levels. From a pure economic stand-
point, it is possible that production can be higher 
by not following all the rules and regulations.
In the industrialized countries, the pro-
cess of law creation, in general, evolves gradu-
ally, and has an organic character. Law creation 
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and viable enforcement develop together. It is 
a harmonic process with the business activities 
or social reforms affected by the legislation. It 
usually proceeds with incremental advances of 
legislation, in tandem with marginal improve-
ments in enforcement procedures. 
Several of these laws, that have been tes-
ted and proven in the developed countries, are 
seen as “role models” by developing countries. 
The laws are studied, and often almost copied 
in their entirety. As a result, the new law in the 
developing country is born as a “supply shock” 
in the domestic culture, and without firm founda-
tions for effective enforcement.     
Theoretical Framework
Suppose L0 is the law (the “domestic“ 
law) which would be consistent with the prevai-
ling social, cultural, and economic conditions of 
the developing country, and apt to be totally en-
forced at once (E0).  Suppose, instead, the coun-
try chooses a “modern” law, L*, with goals much 
more ambitious than the ones envisioned by L0. 
There is a concern for enforcement of the 
new law, and it is assumed the enforcement will 
be gradual. We can think of a kind of flexible ac-
celerator hypothesis, in which the larger the gap 
between L* and L0, the longer the time it will 
require to attain total enforcement. 
The hypothesis is that, by consciously 
choosing the “modern” law, the country plans to 
close a fraction λ of the gap between the desired 
(E*) and actual enforcement each period. Denote 
the enforcement level at the end of last period 
by E-1. The gap between the desired and actual 
levels of enforcement is (E* - E-1). The country 
plans so that the enforcement level at the end of 
the current period E will be such that
E – E-1   =   λ (E* - E-1)     (1)
Equation (1) states that the country plans 
to have the enforcement level at the end of the 
period be such that a fraction λ of the gap be-
tween the desired (E*) and the enforcement level 
that existed at the end of last period is closed. 
Rewriting equation (1),
E =   E-1 +   λ (E* - E-1)    (2)
Equation (2) shows that to increase the 
enforcement level from E-1 to E, the country has 
to make an effort to achieve more enforcement. 
We can say it has either to invest in “moral capi-
tal” or adopt innovations (mainly financial inno-
vations in the case of corporate governance). The 
more the country invests in “moral capital”, the 
more it closes the gap between desired enforce-
ment and actual enforcement. Notice that, when 
choosing the “modern law”, the country has to be 
realistic about the needed investments in “moral 
capital” to enforce the new law. 
Trade-offs between Law Abiding 
and Enforcing Costs
In what follows, a simple theoretical mo-
del is sketched to show the tradeoffs between the 
quality of the laws enacted and the respective de-
gree of enforcement.
Let us assume the country adopts a “mo-
dern” law. As seen in the last section, there will 
be a time interval until the law will be totally en-
forced. In order for the new law to be enforced, 
we can assume there will be two components of 
costs for society. 
The first component is formed by the di-
rect costs (regulation, auditing, accounting, sur-
veillance, etc) for enforcing the law. We can call 
it control costs. 
The second component is formed by the 
negative impact on the moral capital (including 
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self-esteem) of the country when laws are disres-
pected. This loss of moral capital is supposed to 
affect investments and decrease potential GDP. 
We can call it moral costs, translated in monetary 
terms as a depletion of the stock of moral capital. 
Both cost components can be seen as 
monetary costs, the MCC with out-of-pocket 
costs and the MMC as opportunity costs ex-
pressed in monetary terms. Both curves are re-
presented showing increasing marginal costs. 
They are increasing because enforcement costs 
rises more than proportionally when full enfor-
cement is approaching, and moral costs have a 
contagious effect on risks and uncertainties of 
new investments.
We can represent the total marginal costs 
of enforcement (TMCE) as the sum of marginal 
control costs (MCC) and marginal moral costs 
(MMC):
TMCE = MCC + MMC   (1)
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) are graphical re-
presentations of the control costs (MCC). Fi-
gure 1(a) shows in the vertical axis the MCC 
in monetary terms, and in the horizontal axis 
the degree of law violation. From the left to the 
right the degree of law breaking increases, at to 
the point in which the law is totally disobeyed. 
Costs of enforcement are decreasing as we move 
to the right, till they are zero with zero degree of 
enforcement.
Figure 1(b) is the mirror image of Figure 
1(a). In Figure 1(b) the vertical axis is the same, 
but now the horizontal axis shows the degree of 
law enforcement. As we move from the left to 
the right, the degree of law enforcement increa-
ses, up to the point when we reach total enforce-
ment. Marginal control costs increase more than 
proportionally with the strength of enforcement.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the marginal 
moral costs (MMC). Figure 2(a) shows in the 
vertical axis the MMC in monetary terms, and 
in the horizontal axis the degree of law violation. 
From the left to the right the degree of law bre-
aking increases, at to the point in which the law 
is totally disobeyed. Moral damage costs are in-
creasing as we move to the right, till they are at a 
maximum with zero degree of law enforcement.
Figure 2a - MMC                  Figure 2b - MMC
Figure 2(b) is the mirror image of Figure 
2(a). In Figure 2(b) the vertical axis is the same, 
but now the horizontal axis shows the degree of 
law enforcement. As we move from the left to the 
right, the degree of law enforcement increases, 
up to the point when we reach total 
enforcement. Marginal costs decrea-
se more than proportionally with the 
progressive increase of enforcement.
Optimal Level of Enforce-
ment
Based on the considerations 
about the MCC and MMC curves, it Figure 1a -  MCC Figure 1b -  MCC
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is possible to determine the “optimal” level of 
enforcement. We can interpret it as showing the 
expected degree of enforcement at the time the 
“modern” law is enacted.
Figure 3 shows a graph with both curves 
(MCC and MMC). In the vertical axis we have 
the cost in monetary terms, and in the horizon-
tal axis we have the degree of law enforcement. 
However, we can give a different interpretation 
for the MMC curve. We can see it as a demand 
curve. The curve can be seen as showing the be-
nefits to society of law enforcement, and, indi-
rectly, of the strengthening of moral capital. In 
fact, we can interpret the MMC as revealing how 
much society would be willing to pay for not 
suffering the losses imposed by the demoraliza-
tion of law. To have zero tolerance, it would be 
willing to pay the maximum price. As the degree 
of law observance increases, the willingness to 
pay decreases more than proportionally. Thus, in 
that sense, MMC can be interpreted as the Mar-
ginal Benefit Curve of law enforcement.  
 Figure 3 – Optimal Level of Law 
Enforcement
At the point S, where both curves cross, 
OE marks the “optimal” degree of law enforce-
ment expected when launching the “modern” 
law. Total costs are minimized, as shown by the 
area OSE*. The point OE is a Pareto optimum, 
since any other point in the horizontal axis would 
imply an increase in total costs of enforcement.
Innovation and Changes in 
Preferences of Society
We can think of two main ways for ha-
ving “modern” laws with better enforcement.  In 
the first situation, the adoption of innovative ins-
truments can reduce the control costs of enforce-
ment. In other words, innovation in corporate fi-
nance may cause a shift of the MCC curve to the 
lower right. For instance, some new instrument 
that facilitates compliance or reduces agency 
problems, allowing the same level of corporate 
governance using fewer  resources than before 
the use of such instrument.
In Figure 4 we present the effect of inno-
vation on the optimal enforcement level.
 Figure 4 – Effects of Innovation
The decrease of costs, caused by innova-
tion, is represented by a shift of the MCC curve 
to the lower right (From MCC to F1). The new 
equilibrium point (optimal enforcement) now 
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moves from S to F. The degree of law enforce-
ment increases from OE to E1. Notice that with 
the innovation the total costs of enforcement de-
crease by the area OSF. It is a double achieve-
ment: a decrease in costs and an increase in the 
degree of law enforcement.
The second situation is a result of a chan-
ge in the preferences of society regarding the im-
portance of improving moral capital. Suppose 
society decides to invest more real resources in 
order to achieve a positive increment in the stock 
of moral capital. In Figure 5, we represent the 
increase in demand for moral capital as the shif-
ting to the upper left of the MMC curve. The new 
equilibrium point (optimal enforcement) moves 
from OE to E2. In this situation, however, the 
increase in enforcement comes together with an 
increase in total costs of enforcement.  
Figure 5 -  Effects of Changes in the Pre-
ferences of Society
Social, Political, and Economic 
Transformation of Brazil in the 
1880s: Changes in Preferences 
and Financial Innovation
As an example of the application of the 
above analysis to historical events, we examine 
the Corporation Laws of 1882 and 1890.  I con-
sider these laws an economic. political and so-
cial turning point for Brazil during this period, as 
well as a major event in financial development.
The first question is why the country 
decided to have a “modern” corporation law. 
E.Bradford Burns, a historian who wrote a stan-
dard reference book on Brazil, states that:
In 1888, a decade of significant chan-
ges exploded. The abolition of slavery marked 
the opening of that decade; the cataclysmic 
destruction of the folk society at Canudos 
closed it. The years between witnessed the 
overthrow of the monarchy, the establishment 
of a federal republic, the separation of church 
and state, the entry of the cities and the middle 
class into politics, the embrace of industriali-
zation as an economic panacea, and an official 
shift of economic and political power to the 
southeastern states, in particular the recogni-
tion of the importance of São Paulo within that 
triumvirate…the changes between 1888 and 
1897 shared a common denominator: moder-
nization. Their conglomerate recognized the 
end to the centuries ambiguously combining 
neo-capitalism and neo-feudalism. Their con-
glomerate celebrated the triumph of capitalism 
and modernity…In some ways concluding 
three and one-half centuries of history and in 
other ways initiating trends that would charac-
terize the twentieth century, this single ten-year 
period of change stands out as unusually sig-
nificant for any interpretation of the history of 
Brazil (BURNS, 1993, 197/198).
Thus, we can see the demand for having 
a modern law was present in the domestic sce-
nario.  Brazil in the 1880s was experiencing im-
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portant changes. The coffee economy was very 
strong, in spite of the world crisis of 1873. Co-
ffee exports rose from 286.8 million tons in 1880 
to 313.1 million tons in 1890, and revenues in 
sterling grew from 11.6 million in 1880 to 17.8 
million in 1890 (Mello, 1977, p.39). From an 
1819 population around 4.6 million, Brazil had 
grown to 9.9 million in 1872 and to 14.3 million 
in 1890 (MELLO, 1977, ch.2). 
The main political issues were slavery 
and monarchy, and in both fronts the country 
was able to promote peaceful transitions. Large 
numbers of immigrants from Europe, over 2.3 
million in the two decades of the 1880s and the 
1890s, made possible a huge increase in the la-
bor supply. As a consequence, the abolition of 
slavery was accompanied by partial replacement 
of slaves by immigrants, without a decline in  co-
ffee cultivation and exports; cities and markets 
grew steadily during these years. The growth in 
the number and importance of large companies 
will be seen shortly, but the point to emphasize 
is that the corporate form of business, and the 
channels it provides for attracting outside capital 
for investments, were strong factors contributing 
to introduce “modern” laws. 
The other source of pressure for a “mo-
dern” law came from abroad, basically from Gre-
at Britain. During this time, companies from di-
verse segments were listed and traded on the Rio 
de Janeiro Stock Exchange, and later on other 
stock exchanges, particularly São Paulo. These 
segments included railroads, ports, tramways 
and other transportation investments; electricity 
production and distribution; commercial banks; 
textile factories; sugar mills, and others. Several 
historians consider that Brazil, as well other La-
tin American countries like Uruguay and Argen-
tina, were, during that time, in economic terms, 
part of the “informal” British Empire. Thus, the 
capital markets of Brazil had a close relationship 
with British investments and investors. Several 
Brazilian companies even had dual listing and 
traded both on the London and the Rio de Janeiro 
stock exchanges. 
Corporate governance, in a modern sen-
se, started and developed in Brazil during the last 
20 years. One of the main reasons for the rise 
of corporate governance was the participation of 
Brazilian corporations in the emerging markets, 
in which international (mainly institutional) 
investors play a major role. By analogy, since 
our period of studies marks a phase of intense 
foreign investment (mainly British) in shares of 
Brazilian companies, corporate governance – 
even by a different name – must have been an 
important subject. 
The main hypothesis to be dealt with is 
that in the enforcement of the laws, and not in 
the laws themselves, there were huge differen-
ces in corporate governance between Brazil and 
Great Britain. We can conclude that the financial 
innovation occurring in Europe could be used by 
Brazil for enacting “modern” laws.
Brazilian Joint Stock Companies 
in the late 1880s
Although economic activities in Brazil 
in the 19th century were primarily agricultural, 
by the 1870s and 1880s an important host of in-
dustrial and service activities had already emer-
ged. A government survey in 1866 found 43,585 
commercial and industrial businesses in Brazil. 
A further survey in the same year on 20,930 in-
dustrial and commercial establishments found 
that 17,503 of them were owned by single indi-
viduals, and 3,427 (or 16.4 percent) were compa-
nies with a divided share capital (MELLO, 1977, 
131).
In the following year (1867) another 
government survey was made regarding the 
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number of companies with shares floated and 
publicly traded on the capital market. A total of 
69 companies was found (railroads, insurance, 
navigation, gas lighting, mining, water supply, 
turnpikes, market plazas and others), with total 
nominal capital equivalent to 10 million sterling. 
Of this total, 20 were foreign owned compa-
nies, with an average capital of 303,459 sterling 
and 49 were Brazilian owned companies, with 
an average capital of 83,165 sterling (MELLO, 
1977, 132).
In 1887, 5 years after the corporation 
laws of 1882, the government published ano-
ther survey of the joint stock companies. By 
that time, or during the two decades after the 
1867 survey, their number had increased to 135 
companies, with a total capital equivalent to 25 
million sterling. They had also diversified, as can 
be seen in Table 1.
There was an active market for the bon-
ds and shares of a number of joint stock com-
panies on the Stock Exchange of Rio de Janei-
ro. The “Retrospecto Commercial” annual re-
Corporate Governance in Listed Brazilian Companies, 1882-1890: A Theoretical Framework
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Table 1 – Joint Stock Companies in Brazil, end of 1886
Total Number and Capital According to Economic Activities 
(value thousand mil réis)
Source: Relatório do Ministério da Agricultura, 1887























































Simple Average of Rates of 11.52 12.52 5.12
Return
Weighted Average (by capi-
tal) of Rates of Return
11.47 16.45 6.45
Table 2 – Average Yearly Rates of Return on the stocks of various economic activities, transacted in the Rio de 
Janeiro Stock Exchange, in the years of 1877, 1878 and 1882
Source: MELLO, 1984
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view of the Jornal do Commercio published for 
many years the capital stock, the number, par 
(nominal) and market value of shares and bon-
ds, and the nominal dividend rate. In a previous 
published article, I examined the capital markets 
of Brazil during that time from the view point of 
the calculation of financial rates of return (Mello, 
1984). Based on that article, we present in Table 
2 the Invested Capital of the 65 companies, with 
a total capital of 176 million milréis or 17 million 
sterling, and the average yearly rates of return on 
investment in various economic activities with 
shares traded on the Rio de Janeiro Stock Ex-
change in the years 1877, 1878 and 1882.
Mello used another source, the informa-
tion contained in the London Stock Exchange 
Year Book, to produce a sample of the joint stock 
companies listed in London, some of which had 
their legal domicile in England, but which had 
operations only in Brazil. Several of the shares 
had dual listing, on the stock exchanges of Lon-
don and Rio de Janeiro. With this information, 
Mello listed the number and capital of British 
investments in joint stock companies in Brazil in 
1888, presented in Table 3.
Mello, in his Ph.D. dissertation, estima-
ted that the grand total of Brazilian owned ca-
pital invested in Brazilian joint stock companies 
in 1888 was around 39 million sterling. When 
comparing this value with the almost 47 million 
sterling of British investments in Brazilian joint 
stock corporations, the importance of British 
investments in Brazil is placed in perspective. 
(MELLO, 1977, 139/140).
Evaluation of the Enforcement 
of the Corporation Laws of 
1882 and 1890
Comparing the corporate governance 
provisions existent in the Brazilian Corporation 
Laws of the 1880s with what is conventional 
corporate governance today, there are striking 
differences in focus. Although the basics of pro-
visions for information disclosure, accountabili-
ty (“conselho fiscal”, or board of auditors), CEO 
rules of conduct in managing the company, and 
others, were there, I would assess that the major 
concern revealed by the laws was with preven-
tion of a systemic risk for the economy created 
by low capital and excessive leverage.
In order to understand the preoccupa-
tion of 19th century law and policy makers with 
the corporate form of business organization, we 
need to have a historical perspective. We need to 
know more about the debate about corporation 
and joint stock companies in the second half of 
the 19th century, the course of industrialization, 
and the need for large investments made possible 
by the capital markets.
According to Cameron, already in the 
16th century England and Nether-
lands had started joint stock compa-
nies (CAMERON and NEAL, 125). 
In the 17th century, in France, Mi-
nister Colbert codified commercial 
law, with the Ordinance of Trade 
(1673), and created monopolistic 
joint-stock companies (CAMERON 
and NEAL,150). During the initial 
years of the 18th century, two ma-
jor financial crisis hit France (the 
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Table 3 – British Investments in Joint Stock Companies in Brazil, 1888
Source: MELLO, 1984
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Mississipi Bubble) and England (the South Sea 
Bubble). One of the reactions after the crises was 
to create legal barriers against the joint-stock or 
corporate form of business organization. The le-
gal barriers in England would only be lifted in 
the sixth decade of the 19th century (CAMERON 
and NEAL,169). In 1807 Napoleon Bonaparte 
promulgated the Code of Commerce, regulating 
business enterprises. One of the forms of busi-
ness organization was the “societé anonyme” 
(limited liability corporation). In 1867, France 
abolished the need for authorization to grant 
corporation charters, and adopted free incorpo-
ration (CAMERON and NEAL, 2003, 209). Bra-
zil adopted similar laws, with the Commercial 
Law of 1850 creating the institution of “societé 
anonyme”, and in 1882 and 1890 with the im-
provement of the concept of “societé anonyme” 
and the creation of joint stock companies with 
extended freedom for incorporation. The next 
Corporate Governance in Listed Brazilian Companies, 1882-1890: A Theoretical Framework
Corporation Laws 
of Brazil
Main Provisions Comments about Corporate Governance
Law number 3150, 
November 4, 1882 
(Empire of Brazil)
•  Definition of need for authorization for 
establishing corporations
•  Number of 7 partners as the minimum
•  Defines prudential rules for completeness 
of capital
•  Establishes publicity rules for major corpo-
ration acts
•  Establishes rules and duties for managers
•  Defines conflicts of interest and honest rules 
for behavior by managers
•  Defines the rights of shareholders and 
convocation of General Assemblies
•  Defines profit distribution for shareholders
•  Establishes the role and duties of a  Fiscal 
Board
•  Establishes rules for emission of shares and 
corporate bonds
•  Establishes rules for shareholders res-
ponsibilities in the case of company failure 
(bankruptcy) 
•  Most articles set standard rules for corporate governance
•  In comparison with the modern corporate governance, there is 
not a concern about possible agency conflicts
•  The concern is about the honesty of the manager, and not if 
the performance is aligned with the objective of maximizing the 
wealth of shareholders
•  In my view, what is evident is the concern for the corporation 
to act responsibly in the country, and that the shareholders have 
responsibility for the company acts
•  The major device to align shareholders with corporate respon-
sible behavior was through capital completeness requirements
•  Shareholders were required to deposit in currency at least 10% 
of the nominal value of the share, and while the capital comple-
teness of the share value was under 25% the share was nominal 
and had restrictions to be traded in the secondary market
•  In my view, it was the main piece of governance, and the 
target were not the minority shareholders, but the economic 
and financial soundness of the corporation vis a vis the rest of  
society
•  Enforcement of this requirement was poor  
Decree number 
8321, December 
30, 1882 (Empire 
of Brazil)
•  The Decree gives a detailed description of 
how to obey the articles in the Law N. 3150
•  Defines what kind of business can be 
incorporated
•  Defines what corporations still need gover-
nment approval 
•  Explains the provision of reserved liability, 
by which in case of failure of the company the 
shareholders who had paid only one fifth, had 
to pay the remaining four fifths, or have their 
assets seized and auctioned
•  Defines that “the companies, or societé anonymes, are distin-
guishable of other species of societies due to the division of the 
capital in shares, by the limited responsibility of shareholders, 
and by the need of having, at least, seven partners”
•  “All sectors of commerce or industry, or agricultural compa-
nies, and all services of commercial or civil nature can be orga-
nized as corporations, with the exception of business contrary to 
law, moral and good customs”
•  All corporations could be created without government 
approval. The exception was banks, religious associations, food 
retailers and foreign companies. In order to become companies 
they needed government approval.
Decree number 
164, January 17, 
1890 (Republic of 
Brazil)
•  The Decree expanded the list of financial 
institutions requiring government authoriza-
tion: banks of circulation, banks of real credit, 
saving companies, saving banks
•  Increased the responsibilities of company 
managers
•  Increased the rights of shareholders
•  The major feature of this Decree, in my view, was to free the 
creation of banks of the existing contols
•  With the Decree, instead of approval by the Chambers, now 
they needed only executive government approval
•  As a hypothesis, we can view this lack of governance as con-
ducive for abuses and excessive leverage of capital
•  In consequence, banks could leverage money creation. Infla-
tion and financial crisis (“Encilhamento”) was the result
Table 4 – Corporation Laws of Brazil, 1872 and 1890
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important innovation was to extend the concept 
of corporation to commercial banks. This was 
also followed in Brazil in 1890, and it was one 
of the main factors for the financial crisis of the 
“Encilhamento”.
There were three important pieces of le-
gislation, and Table 3 presents them, and their 
major features. Law 3150, of November 4 1882, 
had the stated objective of regulating the esta-
blishment of companies and “societé anony-
mes”. The law has 42 articles, and was approved 
by the General Assembly of the Empire of Bra-
zil, the supreme decision making body including 
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies Decree 
8321, of December 30 1882, has 168 articles, 
establishing the details for the operation and 
enforcement of Law 3150. It was promulgated 
by the Emperor of Brazil (Dom Pedro II), based 
on constitutional powers  given by article 102, 
paragraph 12 of the Political Constitution of the 
Empire. The final piece of legislation was De-
cree 164, of January 17 1890. The objective of 
the Decree was to reform Law 3150. The Decree 
has 43 articles, and was produced about two 
months after the Proclamation of the Republic of 
Brazil. The Decree was headed with the follo-
wing preamble: “ Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, 
Chief of the Provisional Government of the Re-
public of the United States of Brazil, constituted 
by the Army and other Military Forces, in the 
name of the Nation”. This preamble of this De-
cree, in a sense, signalizes that the role model 
for Brazil (now the “United States of Brazil”) 
switched from Great Britain to the United States 
of America.
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Corporate Governance in Listed Brazilian Companies, 1882-1890: A Theoretical Framework
Conclusions   
To conclude this article, I would argue that the corporate governance of these Corporation Laws 
had as its first priority the achievement of liability financial behavior on the part of the companies. Since 
the shareholders had limited responsibility, up to the capital invested in the company, the Corporation 
Laws were concerned that the shareholders would effectively pay in the full amount of the capital. The 
permission to trade shares subscribed, but not paid in, on the secondary market was contingent on the 
payment  of minimum tranches of capital to complete the nominal value of the share, calculated in 
relation to the “authorized capital”.
The evidence presented or mentioned by several commentators indicates poor enforcement (it 
seems fraudulent behavior was widespread) of the two major restrictions: to not pay in the capital subs-
cribed, and to trade the shares before meeting the minimum paid in capital requirements.
As we argued in the beginning of the article, perhaps there was a conscious decision to relax the 
enforcement of the new laws. By not fully paying in the capital subscribed, the capital of the sharehol-
ders could be leveraged, and they could acquire more shares than their income would allow. This would 
create more public offerings and trading on the capital markets.
As we saw, the country’s economy was changing fast, companies were founded, the domestic 
market was expanding with immigration and abolition of slavery, the coffee market was booming, and 
the economy needed large amounts of capital to finance the new ventures. The trade off was to enlarge 
the capitalization of companies and the leverage of shareholders’ investments, by lenience on enforce-
ment of capital requirements, and a blind eye for what was happening in the market.
The financial crisis of Encilhamento is claimed to be a result of this lack of control. There is a 
hot debate in Brazil about the causes of the Encilhamento (see Schulz, 1996 and Suzigan, 2000). As a 
contribution for this debate, I would argue the following:
the two pieces of corporation legislation of 1882 had a positive net impact on the establishment 
of new ventures, and the investments in the primary issues of corporations;
the 1890 Decree, in that it encouraged the creation of banks with the power to issue money, 
perhaps failed in the task of “macroeconomic governance”. The growth of the banks of issue probably 
provided too much money to the economy in a short period, even considering that the economy was 
transforming from a slave “low money” economy to a “high money” market economy;
the lack of governance, in a sense, was partially responsible for the overshooting of the money 
supply, the inflationary pressures, and the financial bubble in the stock market;
if we return to the Equation (1), which states that “the country plans to have the enforcement 
level at the end of the period be such that a fraction λ of the gap between the desired (E*) and the en-
forcement level that existed at the end of last period is closed”. Accepting the model, the problem of the 
1890 Decree was not the lenience about enforcement, since it was expected and part of the “rationality” 
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of the introduction of a “modern” law. My hypothesis is that λ was not properly managed or forecasted.
In my opinion, as a contribution to economic growth and development of the primary market of 
shares negotiated on the Stock Exchange, the 1880s and 1890s were more relevant for capital market 
development than the other decades that followed, up to the present day.
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